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PROTECTING CLIMATE CHANGE LAW
FROM A REVIVED NONDELEGATION
DOCTRINE
Andrew Rockett*
In an era of political gridlock, a potential revitalization of the nondelegation
doctrine threatens the Environmental Protection Agency’s existing framework for regulating
greenhouse gas emissions and addressing the urgent threat of climate change. At its apex, the
nondelegation doctrine briefly constrained permissible delegations from the legislature to the
executive branch after two Supreme Court decisions in 1935. The doctrine has since weakened
under the lenient “intelligible principle” standard. That standard today allows the legislative
branch to make broad delegations to administrative arms of the executive branch, which then
use technological and bureaucratic expertise to clarify, implement, and enforce statutes. The
result is today’s administrative state—the federal government’s answer to the demanding
complexities of modern society, the expansive duties of the federal government, and intense
political gridlock in the legislature. However, with multiple Supreme Court Justices indicating
support for reviving a stricter form of the nondelegation doctrine, many key, broad agency
delegations are under threat, including the Clean Air Act’s delegation to the Environmental
Protection Agency requiring regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. The urgency of the fight
against climate change, combined with the political difficulty in passing new legislation,
necessitates careful consideration of what revived nondelegation doctrine may require of
legislative tasks assigned to the executive. In this note, I analyze the potential threat and its
solutions and conclude that a revived nondelegation doctrine poses a substantial threat to the
Clean Air Act’s delegation to the EPA. For this reason, intricate constitutional arguments
and carefully crafted legislation may both be necessary to preserve the EPA’s ability to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions.

* University of Michigan J.D. candidate, 2022. I would like to thank Evan Neustater, Ruth Wu,
Matt Piggins, Jonny McKoy, and Rebecca Conway for their critiques and edits on this note. I would
additionally like to thank MJEAL's entire Volume 11 staff for their diligent work editing and cite-checking
this note.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Climate change law and the climate crisis
As the climate change threat looms, domestic environmental law has been
slow to respond.1 The federal legislature has not amended the Clean Air Act, the
EPA’s primary vehicle for greenhouse gas emission regulation, since the early 1990s.2
Many modern advances in climate change regulation thus rely on older laws and
mandates that predate mass awareness of the climate crisis.3 In particular, Title I and
Title II of the Clean Air Act instruct the EPA to regulate emissions from stationary
sources and command the EPA to regulate emissions from moving sources such as
motor vehicles.4 Title I mandates that the EPA Administrator set National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), “the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are
requisite to protect the public health.”5 In a climate change context, the EPA has
interpreted this statutory language as extending to stationary source emissions of
gases relevant to climate change, such as ozone.6 The agency uses its Title I grant to
regulate emissions from a wide variety of existing and newly made stationary
sources.7 Meanwhile, Title II requires that the EPA regulate “the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 8 Title II is even
more essential to the EPA’s ability to combat climate change because the EPA
interprets Title II of the Clean Air Act to require that it regulate greenhouse gas

1.
THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY, UNLOCKING THE INCLUSIVE GROWTH STORY OF THE
21ST CENTURY (2018), https://newclimateeconomy.report/2018/key-findings/. The Report proposes that
“unless we make a decisive shift [in efforts to address and mitigate climate change], by 2030 we will pass
the point by which we can keep global average temperature rise to well below 2 ºC.” Id. at 8.
2.
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671. While the United States has since participated in
various conferences and joined cooperative international efforts such as the Paris Agreement, Congress
has largely neglected to address climate change through direct legislation.
3.
See, e.g., Richard Wiles, It’s 50 years since climate change was first seen. Now time is running out,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/15/50-yearsclimate-change-denial.
4.

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.

5.

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).

6.
See NAAQS Table, ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-airpollutants/naaqs-table (last visited Dec. 26, 2021).
7.

Id.

8.

42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
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emissions from motor vehicles,9 which constitute the largest individual source of
greenhouse gas emissions.10
The EPA’s use of the Clean Air Act to regulate motor-vehicle-greenhousegas emissions has a controversial history. In 2007, Massachusetts v. EPA solidified the
EPA’s mandate to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, but the Supreme Court
narrowly decided the case, with Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer forming a five Justice majority over Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas, Alito, and Scalia.11 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts
extensively argued that the state of Massachusetts lacked standing.12 A separate
dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito, agreed that the petitioners lacked standing and objected to the
majority ruling on its merits. Scalia argued that the EPA Administrator has the
discretion to decide when to address air pollutants under the Clean Air Act, writing
that the “EPA's interpretation of the discretion conferred by the statutory reference
to ‘its judgment’ is not only reasonable, it is the most natural reading of the text.”13
Scalia additionally believed that the EPA could reasonably conclude that carbon
dioxide was not an air pollutant as defined by the Clean Air Act, stating “regulating
the buildup of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the upper reaches of the
atmosphere, which is alleged to be causing global climate change, is not akin to
regulating the concentration of some substance that is polluting the air.”14
The window for effective climate change mitigation shrinks every year
while political pressure for a federal answer to climate change approaches its zenith.15
While legislative climate change mitigation efforts have stagnated, various emerging
policy efforts such as the Green New Deal or a carbon tax may directly invigorate
the federal initiative against climate change in the future.16 However, with climate
change denial still gripping voters nationwide and a legislative branch where the
majority party frequently changes, new environmental legislation seems unlikely.17
9.
See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
10. See, e.g., Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited December 26, 2021).
11. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that the EPA has and should
exercise the authority to issue mandatory regulations addressing climate change)
12.

Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

13.

Id. at 552-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

14.

Id. at 559.

15. See, e.g., Catherine Clifford, Carbon capture technology has been around for decades — here’s why
it hasn’t taken off, CNBC (Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/31/carbon-capturetechnology.html.
16.

See generally H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019).

17. A survey by the YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project found that 13% of Americans believe
that human activity is not at all responsible for climate change, while 5% did not believe that the climate
was changing at all. An additional 13% of respondents answered that they did not know whether the
climate was changing or if people were responsible. See, e.g., Oliver Milman and Fiona Harvey, US is
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B. The nondelegation doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine is, at its core, a constitutional principle
asserting that the legislative branch of the federal government cannot delegate its
legislative power to other branches of government.18 The staunchest supporters of
the nondelegation doctrine cite the principle of the separation of powers in arguing
that the legislative vesting clause of the Constitution is an exclusive grant of legislative
power that limits the scope of permissible rulemaking from the executive branch.19
The Supreme Court has only invalidated two statutes for violating the nondelegation
doctrine, with both instances arising in 1935 during the New Deal Era’s
unprecedented federal government expansion. Yet, the nondelegation doctrine has a
long, contentious history in American constitutional law.20 For instance, both the
Federalist papers and treatises by political theorist John Locke contemplated the
value of nondelegation. In the words of John Locke:
The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any
other hands. For it being but a delegated Power from the People,
they, who have it, cannot pass it over to others. . . . And when the
people have said, We will submit to rules, and be govern'd by
Laws made by such Men, and in such Forms, no Body else can say
other Men shall make Laws for them; nor can the people be bound
by any Laws but such as are Enacted by those, whom they have
Chosen, and Authorised to make Laws for them. The power of the
Legislative being derived from the People by a positive voluntary
Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what the positive
Grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to make

hotbed of climate change denial, major global survey finds, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/07/us-hotbed-climate-change-denialinternational-poll. For a comprehensive look at how American beliefs on climate change have shifted over
time, but with many still remaining skeptical on the extent of climate change and its human causes, see
also Xinran Wang, Anthony Leiserowitz, and Jennifer Marlon, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMUNICATION
(Mar.
31,
2021),
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizationsdata/americans-climate-views/.
18.

Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019).

19.

See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 2-5 (2014).

20.

For instance, Professor Lawson posits that

[t]he nondelegation doctrine, however, is the Energizer Bunny of constitutional law: No
matter how many times it gets broken, beaten, or buried, it just keeps on going and going.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Trucking was merely a continuation of a series of
attempts by lawyers and judges in the past decade to find some way around the
unmistakable import of Mistretta. And in turn, the Supreme Court’s decision in American
Trucking was merely a continuation of the Court’s decidedly unsympathetic response to
these efforts.
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2002).
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Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to transfer their
Authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.21
Further, James Madison later contemplated in Federalist No. 51 that “the
great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the
necessary constitutional means . . . to resist encroachments of the others.”22 Thus,
although an originalist view may classify delegation less as an encroachment between
branches and more a willing grant of power from the legislature to another branch,
the same principles against the concentration of power apply. Chief Justice Marshall
reflected this when he asserted that Congress is unable to “delegate . . . powers which
are strictly and exclusively legislative.”23
Still, the Framers acknowledged that total separation of powers is likely
impossible.24 Indeed, many constitutional scholars argue that the Framers never
intended to bar the legislature from delegating its legislative power to the other
branches.25 In a modern context, many agree that the nondelegation doctrine would
be hugely consequential if revived today, considering the federal government’s
extensive reliance on the growing administrative state.26
Following the two 1935 Supreme Court decisions that endorsed
nondelegation, the Supreme Court quickly began to defer to the lenient “intelligible
principle” test when deciding nondelegation questions.27 Under this test, which first
appeared in 1825, so long as Congress provides an “intelligible principle” to guide a
statute’s implementation and interpretation, there is no unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power.28 The intelligible principle test enables many considerably vague
statutory directives from the legislature.29 Writing for an eight-Justice majority,
Justice Brennan elaborated on the practical justifications for a lenient intelligible
principle standard in Mistretta v United States:

21. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 362-63 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
22.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).

23.

Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42 (1825).

24. See, e.g., id. at 43 (“But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature
may rightfully exercise itself.”).
25.

See id.

26. For example, Justice Kagan wrote in her majority opinion for Gundy v. United States that “if
[the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act]’s delegation is unconstitutional, then most of
government is unconstitutional.” 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019).
27. See generally Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
28.

See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).

29.

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129.
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Applying this ‘intelligible principle’ test to congressional
delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete
with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
general directives. Accordingly, this Court has deemed it
‘constitutionally sufficient’ if Congress clearly delineates the
general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the
boundaries of this delegated authority.30
The Supreme Court continues to resort to the intelligible principle test to
answer nondelegation challenges. Furthermore, only a few dissenting or concurring
opinions over the last several decades have questioned the constitutionality of the
intelligible principle test as applied.31 To say that the intelligible principle test
weakened the nondelegation doctrine post-Schechter would be an understatement. In
the past several decades, numerous agencies have successfully relied on the test to
survive nondelegation challenges to statutes: Justice Kagan noted in her Gundy
majority that the Supreme Court has allowed legislative demands to regulate in the
“public interest,” instructions to set “fair and reasonable” prices, and, in the case of
the Clean Air Act, a command to set air quality standards “requisite to protect the
public health.”32
Notwithstanding this relatively minimal role of the nondelegation doctrine,
however, the threat of a new era of the nondelegation doctrine looms large. Justice
Neil Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Gundy v. United States signaled significant
Supreme Court support for revising the intelligible principle test to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine more strictly.33 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas
joined Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, while Justice Alito voiced his support for revising
the Court’s approach to the nondelegation doctrine in his concurring opinion in the
same case.34 Further, the two newest members of the Court (Justices Kavanaugh and
Barrett) are potential supporters of the nondelegation doctrine.35 The current
30.

488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989).

31. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Pet. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
32. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129; see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001)
(holding, through Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, that the Clean Air Act’s delegation to the EPA was
“well within the outer limits of our nondelegation precedents”).
33.

See 139 S. Ct. at 2131-48 (Gorusch, J., dissenting).

34. See id. at 2130-31. It is also worth noting that, but for Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, the
case would have ended in a 4-4 tie with no opinions released. Justice Alito’s concurrence could thus perhaps
be interpreted as an intentional showing of the Supreme Court’s shifting thoughts on nondelegation
doctrine.
35. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the
denial of certiorari); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Suspension and Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 265
(2014).
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composition of the Court thus renders the nondelegation doctrine more likely than
ever to resurface in a stricter form.

II. ANTICIPATING NEW NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
By consulting various opinions authored by current Supreme Court Justices
in support of revisiting the nondelegation doctrine, it is possible to gauge the
Supreme Court’s support for tightening the intelligible principle standard and to
broadly outline a legal standard upon which a statute would pass constitutional
muster under a revived nondelegation doctrine. In particular, Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent in Gundy describes several areas of dissatisfaction with the intelligible
principle test as it currently operates while also setting out basic requirements and
inquiries for a future replacement to the intelligible principle test.36
Because the Supreme Court has undergone significant turnover since the
publication of Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent, a revamped nondelegation doctrine stands a
realistic chance of cementing itself in constitutional law for decades to come. That is,
Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett have joined the court, with the latter replacing Justice
Ginsburg (who signed on to the majority opinion in Gundy and accordingly
supported the original intelligible principle test).37 These two Justices, along with the
Chief Justice and Justice Thomas (who each joined in Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent) and
Justice Alito (who separately expressed, through his Gundy concurrence, a willingness
to reanalyze the intelligible principle test), increase the likelihood of a revamping of
the nondelegation doctrine by the conservative bloc.38
In sum, the Gundy dissent seems most likely to form the basis of postintelligible principle nondelegation doctrine; however, through other written
opinions and articles, other members of the Court have discussed the nondelegation
doctrine and provided potential hints as to their thoughts on how to constrain the
intelligible principle doctrine. Analyzing these sources holistically shows how Justice
Gorsuch’s proposed Gundy framework could influence decisions if it ever does
become the law of the land.

A. Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent
Taking a fiery stand against the intelligible principle test, Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent in Gundy alerted legal experts across the country of the nondelegation
36.

See 139 S. Ct at 2138-42 (Gorusch, J., dissenting).

37.

See generally id.

38. Justice Alito wrote in his one-page concurring opinion in Gundy that, since 1935, the Supreme
Court has consistently upheld statutory provisions that provide agencies with rulemaking power within
“extraordinarily capacious standards,” and that it would be “freakish” to isolate the provision at issue in
Gundy for “special treatment.” Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito importantly espoused that
“[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years,
I would be willing to support that effort.” Id.
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doctrine’s potential resurgence.39 The opinion espouses the constitutional purposes
of the nondelegation doctrine, citing many of the sources that appear in the above
section on nondelegation, including Locke’s treatise and The Federalist No. 51. The
dissent ultimately attempts to lay out a constitutional test for preventing
unconstitutional delegations.40 Justice Gorsuch further argues that the intelligible
principle test has taken on a life of its own that allows several delegations that extend
beyond the permissible categories he outlines.41
In particular, Justice Gorsuch highlights three categories of permissible,
non-legislative delegations that the legislature may constitutionally provide to the
executive. First, the legislature may command agencies to “fill up the details” of a
statute.42 Second, it may make the application of a rule depend on executive factfinding.43 And third, it may allow other branches to develop non-legislative aspects
of statutory application.44 He concludes with what he believes to be the proper
constitutional inquiry for measuring a delegation’s constitutionality:
To determine whether a statute provides an intelligible principle,
we must ask: Does the statute assign to the executive only the
responsibility to make factual findings? Does it set forth the facts
that the executive must consider and the criteria against which to
measure them? And most importantly, did Congress, and not the
Executive Branch, make the policy judgments? Only then can we
fairly say that a statute contains the kind of intelligible principle
the Constitution demands.45
In the context of Gundy, Justice Gorsuch found a nondelegation issue with
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s provision toward pre-Act
offenders.46 The Act, also known as SORNA, provided that “[t]he Attorney General
shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this
subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter . . . and
to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offender.”47 The Act did not
39. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Kovacs, Did the Dissent in Gundy v. United States Open Up a Can of Worms?
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY (June 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/did-thedissent-in-gundy-v-united-states-open-up-a-can-of-worms/.
40.

See generally Gundy, 139 S. Ct at 2133-43 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

41.

Id. at 2139.

42.

Id. at 2136.

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 2137.

45.

Id. at 2141.

46. See id. at 2143 (outlining way in which Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act gives
Attorney General unfettered discretion to make policy judgements, a key indication of a nondelegation
issue).
47.

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).
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meet those standards, as Justice Gorsuch found this delegation to be too vague,
especially considering the due process concerns that come with criminal penalties.48
Perhaps in response to the majority’s own assertion that an expansive
nondelegation doctrine would endanger much of our current administrative state and
legislative function,49 Justice Gorsuch argues that revived nondelegation doctrine
would not cause immense, radical change to the federal government’s current
operation.50 He cites doctrines like the major questions doctrine51 and negative
treatments of vagueness in legislation as current limiting factors on impermissible
delegations.52 Justice Gorsuch also tempers the extent of his argument by stating that
the scope of the problems caused by the intelligible principle test can be overstated,
citing the impressive flexibility that the legislature can build into laws by
conditioning certain duties on executive fact-finding and implicating the president’s
Article II authority.53 Nevertheless, many commentators were still alarmed at the
contents of Justice Gorsuch’s dissent and saw the potential for the nondelegation
doctrine to upset the federal government’s current balance between legislative
lawmaking and executive rulemaking.54
Thus, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent is a useful reflection on the negative view
that multiple members of the Court hold toward the intelligible principle test, and it
also may foreshadow future Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue. It is,
however, unable to provide a complete perspective on the issue. While the Gundy
dissent provides the most relevant framework for future nondelegation law, other
members of the Court have provided their comments on the intelligible principle
test in recent years. Their thoughts may similarly hint at the future of the
nondelegation doctrine.

48. See Gundy, 138 S. Ct. at 2132-33 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting "[t]he breadth of the
authority Congress granted to the Attorney General in these few words can only be described as vast"
given “Mr. Gundy faced an additional 10-year prison term—10 years more than if the Attorney General
had, in his discretion, chosen to write the rules differently”).
49.

Id. at 2130.

50. See id. at 2145 (noting, in Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion, that “enforcing the
Constitution’s demands [would not] spell doom for what some call the ‘administrative state’”).
51. As most recently expressed in King v. Burwell, the major questions doctrine assumes that
Congress will not delegate to an agency discretion on an extremely important issue (such as climate change
or healthcare administration, as was at issue in King) without expressly saying as such. 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
As is, the major questions doctrine operates as a sort of exception to normal Chevron deference, where
legislative silence is taken to denote a decision-making delegation to the agency. See generally Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 476 U.S. 837 (1984).
52.

See Gundy, 138 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

53.

See id. at 2140 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

54. For example, Professor Kovacs observes that requiring Congress to “make all requisite policy
decisions” would “grind regulatory lawmaking to a halt.” Kovacs, supra note 39.
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B. Beyond Gundy
Since the Court decided Gundy, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett have joined
the Court, and there is reason to believe that both would entertain a constitutional
challenge to the intelligible principle test.55 In years past, other Justices currently on
the Court have expressed interest in revisiting the nondelegation doctrine, thereby
shedding some light on their theories of the permissible range of legislative
delegation. Justices Kavanaugh, Thomas, and, to a lesser degree, Barrett, have
discussed or implicated their views on nondelegation and the intelligible principle
test.
First, Justice Kavanaugh indicated his skepticism toward the
constitutionality of the current intelligible principle standard in a statement
regarding the certiorari denial for Paul v. United States.56 Specifically, Justice
Kavanaugh wrote that “Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s
nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in
future cases.”57 Justice Kavanaugh similarly indicated that Justice Rehnquist raised
important questions about nondelegation in his concurring opinion in Industrial
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute.58 Justice Kavanaugh framed his
analysis through the major questions doctrine. He stated that, while the Court has
not explicitly adopted a nondelegation principle toward major questions of policy, it
has limited delegation through the major questions doctrine.59 He concluded that the
current framework might need to be revised.60 In these ways, Justice Kavanaugh
shows significant support for reviving the nondelegation doctrine through his
positive comments on Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent and his conclusion that the
existing framework may require another look.
Second, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Whitman v. American Trucking
Association questioned the intelligible principle doctrine’s effectiveness at preventing
unconstitutional delegations of legislative power. Here, the majority applied the
intelligible principle test to Title I of the Clean Air Act command that the EPA
promulgate NAAQS “requisite to protect the public health.”61 The majority
concluded that that directive was not an impermissible delegation of legislative power
under the intelligible principle test.62 Justice Thomas’s short concurrence, however,
55. See 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari);
see also Barrett, supra note 35, at 265.
56.

See Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari).

57.

Id. (citing Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2131-48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)).

58. Id. (citing Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685–86 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

See Whitman, 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).

62.

Id.
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noted that, while the statutory language at issue satisfied the requirements of the
intelligible principle test, “there are cases in which the principle is intelligible, and
yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to
be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”63 Justice Thomas then concludes the
opinion by expressing willingness to scrutinize the existing intelligible principle test
against the Constitution’s delegatory restrictions: “[o]n a future day . . . I would be
willing to address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too
far from our Founders’ understanding of separation of powers.”64 Thus, Justice
Thomas’s concurrence emphasizes that the legislative vesting clause of the
Constitution places all legislative powers with the legislative branch.65 Notably,
however, this language hardly reveals how Justice Thomas would strengthen the
intelligible principle test. Nevertheless, by joining Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy,
Justice Thomas demonstrated his continued willingness to revisit the question of the
nondelegation doctrine, and, as his concurring opinion indicates, particularly toward
its application to the Title I mandate of the Clean Air Act.
Third, with only three years of experience on the Seventh Circuit bench
before her Supreme Court appointment, Justice Barrett’s views on the nondelegation
doctrine are less clear. One piece of Justice Barrett’s scholarship – specifically, an
article titled Suspension and Delegation – merely reveals her belief that certain
congressional delegations are likely subject to judicial review and acknowledges that
“the modern nondelegation doctrine imposes few limits upon Congress’s ability to
shift policymaking discretion to the Executive.”66 The article, which explores
Congress’s broad delegations to the Executive regarding suspensions of the writ of
habeas corpus, otherwise sheds little light on Justice Barrett’s beliefs regarding the
nondelegation doctrine. It is nonetheless worth noting she demonstrates skepticism
toward some of Congress’s delegations regarding suspension powers.67
Altogether, the above materials reveal that several Justices on the Court
who agree or seem to agree that the nondelegation doctrine should be reanalyzed
have their own distinct interests and points of emphasis on the topic. With an
apparent majority of the Court dissatisfied with the intelligible principle doctrine,
all of these perspectives may affect the analytical framework that could usurp it.

C. New nondelegation
Given the apparent support of multiple Justices on the bench, Justice
Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent ultimately lays the groundwork for the most likely successor
to the intelligible principle test. Further, Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Gorsuch
63.

Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Barrett, supra note 35, at 265.

67.

Id.
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have all recently cited the major questions doctrine or a close relative in their
nondelegation discussions.68 One could thus anticipate a focus on major questions in
applications of a new nondelegation doctrine. This development could be particularly
pertinent for statutes like the Clean Air Act, which grants the EPA the authority to
oversee greenhouse gas emissions standards without explicitly mentioning an
intention to broadly address climate change.69

III.IMPLICATIONS
Writing for the majority in Gundy, Justice Kagan warned that “if SORNA’s
delegation is unconstitutional, then most of government is unconstitutional.”70
Indeed, revived nondelegation doctrine stands to critically upset the existing
dynamic between the legislature and the administrative state.71 That dynamic is
essential to the federal government’s efficient operation today.72 Legislators and
agency administrators would have to reassess several established statutory provisions
against a new constitutional standard for legislative delegation.73 The EPA’s
operations under the Clean Air Act, and specifically its reliance on Title I and Title
II for regulating greenhouse gas emissions from stationary and moving sources,
respectively, are no exception. In the following sections, I will analyze the Clean Air
Act, Titles I and II, within this framework.

A. Title I’s intelligible principle
Title I of the Clean Air Act sets up a complex regulatory scheme through
which the EPA (1) sets air quality standards (NAAQS) for a variety of pollutants
and then (2) coordinates with states to ensure that stationary emission sources follow
these standards and advance toward emissions targets.74 Specifically, § 109(b)(1) of
the Act commands the EPA administrator to set air quality standards “the attainment
and maintenance of which . . . are requisite to protect the public health" with "an
adequate margin of safety."75 This statutory delegation to the EPA was the subject of
a nondelegation challenge in Whitman. Although Title I survived that nondelegation
68. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I believe that there are cases in which
the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great for the
decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative’”); see also Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342
(Kavanuagh, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2141-2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
69.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.

70.

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74.

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.

75.

42 U.S.C. § 7401.
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inquiry under the intelligible principle test, it would likely violate a more stringent
nondelegation standard. The Whitman court decided that the Clean Air Act’s Title I
requirements for the EPA were specific enough to pass the intelligible principle test
but spoke little of the Act’s validity beyond that.76 Indeed, the concurring opinion by
Justice Thomas strongly implies that the statute would not be safe from a closer
inquiry that directly implicates the constitutionality of the intelligible principle
test.77
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Whitman is especially ominous when
considered in the context of a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine. In it, Justice
Thomas laments that “none of the parties . . . examined the text of the Constitution
or asked us to reconsider our precedents on cessions of legislative power.”78 He
continues to note that “there are cases in which the principle is intelligible and yet
the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be
called anything other than ‘legislative.’”79 This statement is particularly concerning
for the EPA because authorization for its current climate change-focused regulation
of carbon emissions is dependent on a law that does not expressly mention climate
change.80
At this moment, climate change is arguably the most pressing issue facing
the United States and the world at large. To best prepare the sorts of complex
regulatory schemes that might help combat it, the United States needs to make use
of its administrative state. Justice Thomas’s Whitman opinion signals that Title I
provides the EPA with the exact sort of vague, inexact guidelines that he believes to
be constitutionally suspect under the nondelegation doctrine; if his view became law,
the EPA’s ability to rely on an issue such as climate change while setting NAAQS
would be in jeopardy. While Justice Thomas writes alone in his concurrence, the
skeptical language of his opinion combined with the majority’s qualifier that Title I’s
mandate permissibly delegated under the intelligible principle test (without
supporting it under a theoretical, more stringent standard that we may soon see) does
not bode well for the constitutionality of Title I’s delegation to the EPA.

B. Title II’s intelligible principle
Title II of the Clean Air Act provides that the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) “shall by regulation prescribe . . .
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of
new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
76.

See Whitman, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).

77.

Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).

78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80.

See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
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health or welfare.”81 While the mandate facially appears quite vague, a past Supreme
Court case settled an argument over the proper interpretation of the mandate,
ultimately leaving significantly less room for EPA discretion and possibly indirectly
insulating the provision from a nondelegation issue.82
A key issue in Massachusetts v. EPA was whether Title II of the Clean Air
Act applies to the EPA’s regulation of carbon emissions from motor vehicles.83 In
this context, an “air pollutant” is “any air pollution agent or combination of such
agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”84 The question ultimately hinged upon the
word “including” and whether the immediately preceding words, “air pollution
agents,” limit it.85 On the one hand, if “including” limits “air pollution agents,” then
the Clean Air Act only defines physical and chemical substances emitted into the air
as air pollutants if they are air pollution agents.86 This, according to Justice Scalia,
would destroy the Act’s applicability to carbon emissions due to an atmospheric
argument (although the majority contested that the dissent’s argument that carbon
emissions could not be considered “air pollution agents” was baseless).87 On the other
hand, if “including” is not so limited, then any physical or chemical matter that enters
ambient air can be defined as an air pollutant.88 The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA
concluded that the latter interpretation was correct, and as such, that emitted carbon
is classifiable as an air pollutant.89 In resolving the question of the proper
interpretation of “air pollutant,” stare decisis may serve to protect the EPA’s Title II
grant by protecting the original interpretation of the Act that left significantly less
discretion with the EPA Administrator.
Despite the Supreme Court’s potential preclusion of the issue in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Clean Air Act’s Title II basis as it concerns EPA motor
vehicle emissions standards underlies issues raised in Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy
dissent. That is, even when following the majority’s interpretation of the Act, the
Title II grant is still vague and potentially constitutes a major questions problem
because, without explicitly mentioning climate change, Title II lays the foundation
for a major portion of the federal government’s attempts to mitigate climate change.
Thus, while stare decisis may allow the Massachusetts v. EPA opinion to protect Title
II’s delegation more effectively than Whitman does Title I, it still may face challenges
under a new nondelegation standard.
81.

Id. at § 7521(a)(1).

82.

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).

83.

Id. at 505.

84.

42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).

85.

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29; id. at 556 (Scalia J. dissenting).

86.

Id. at 556-58.

87.

Id. at 556, 529 n.26.

88.

Id. at 532.

89.

Id.
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C. Dangerous timing
Given the urgent need for effective climate change mitigation, the EPA’s
ability to curtail greenhouse gas emissions may be an essential piece of the United
States’ ability to combat climate change. In this way, with a decade remaining before
the costs from climate change threaten to become truly and unavoidably catastrophic,
the potential radical restructuring of the agency-reliant federal government that the
nondelegation doctrine threatens comes at what could be the worst possible time.90A
worst-case scenario where, amidst continued federal inaction, the nondelegation
doctrine shuts down the Clean Air Act’s application to greenhouse gas emission
regulation is dire indeed. That said, even if the nondelegation doctrine does return,
this paper next suggests a few potential avenues that may spare the EPA’s greenhouse
gas regulation mandate from the nondelegation doctrine.

IV.PROTECTING THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATORY REGIME FROM
REVIVED NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

As outlined above, a revamped nondelegation doctrine threatens to
extinguish the EPA’s current legal mandate for regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
This note identifies at least two avenues that may either preserve the EPA’s current
regulatory mandates or replace them with a new system that complies with the likely
requirements of a stricter nondelegation doctrine: constitutional arguments and new
legislation.91 EPA’s Title I and Title II mandates are both immensely important to
protect. Based on a heightened intelligible principle standard, Title I is likely to fail
a post-intelligible-principle-nondelegation test whereas, Title II can be sustained by
defending the textual interpretation that drove the original holding in Massachusetts
v. EPA. However, both Titles can be protected by enacting new legislation that
specifically tasks the executive branch with regulating greenhouse gas emissions as a
response to climate change.92 No path provides an easy, guaranteed circumvention
to a heightened nondelegation doctrine, but the necessity of protecting Title I and
II’s delegation combined with the sheer reality of modern government’s reliance on
the administrative state leave few other options.93

90. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (“IPCC”), SPECIAL
REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 ºC (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/spm/; see also U.S. GLOB.
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (“NCA”) (2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/.
91.

See infra at Part IV.B.

92. While the requisite legislative guidance, of course, depends on whichever hypothetical form
the new nondelegation doctrine assumes, simply ensuring that any new legislation directly mentions the
EPA and its responsibility to address climate change by regulating greenhouse gas emissions would
potentially satisfy Justice Gorsuch’s proposed ruleset in Gundy. See 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136-37 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
93.

See supra at Part I.A.
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A. Title I: Whitman’s warning
The narrow scope of the holding in Whitman – that the delegated authority
passes constitutional muster under the intelligible principle test – suggests that
principles like stare decisis are unlikely to protect Title I’s delegation once the
intelligible principle test no longer screens delegations. Perhaps counterintuitively,
the narrow scope seems to harm rather than justify Title I’s delegation due to
Whitman’s repeated specification that Title I permissibly delegates under the
intelligible principle standard.94 As discussed earlier, Justice Thomas’s concurrence
shows that intelligible principles such as those in Title I of the Clean Air Act are
almost certainly what Supreme Court Justices had in mind when calling for a revised
nondelegation doctrine.95 So long as the Supreme Court is potentially compelled to
revisit and revive the nondelegation doctrine, the prospects for defending Title I’s
delegation on constitutional grounds appear slim.
The vulnerability of the EPA’s Title I NAAQS regime can, however, be
remedied with an alternative solution discussed below: either (1) via an amendment
to the Clean Air Act or (2) entirely new legislation specifying the EPA’s role in
addressing climate change.96 Although these options each carry their unique
strengths and difficulties, they may be the only routes to effective protection (or even
enhancement) of the current NAAQS regime.

B. Title II: Defending Massachusetts v. EPA
As an initial matter, should the nondelegation doctrine be strengthened
beyond the intelligible principle standard, constitutionally defending the EPA’s
current mobile source greenhouse gas regulation framework in conformance with the
new nondelegation doctrine may be necessary.97 Should Title II’s grant to the EPA
come under nondelegation scrutiny, reasserting the interpretation of the Clean Air
Act that carried the day in Massachusetts v. EPA can diminish the possibility of a
finding of an impermissible delegation because that case held that (1) the Clean Air
Act required the EPA to determine whether greenhouse gases contribute to climate
change, (2) an endangerment finding would mandate the EPA to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions, and (3) the Act constrained the Agency’s discretion to “pursue other
priorities of the Administrator or the President” instead of reaching a decision on
whether it needed to regulate moving source greenhouse gas emissions.98 In short,
the holding endorsed a reading of the Act that greatly limited the scope of discretion
within Title II’s grant.
94.

531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).

95.

See supra at 14-15.

96.

See infra at 26-29.

97.

See infra at 27-31 for a discussion of difficulties in passing new legislation.

98.

549 U.S. 497, 533-34 (2007).
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The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA interpreted the Clean Air Act to
compel the EPA to determine whether greenhouse gases are “air pollutants”
endangering the public health and to regulate motor vehicles emitting greenhouse
gases accordingly.99 In a nondelegation context, when the majority held that the
Clean Air Act compelled the EPA to determine whether greenhouse gas emissions
endangered public health and to regulate greenhouse gas emissions accordingly, it
read the Clean Air Act in a way that limited the EPA’s decision-making abilities
under its Title II grant.100 Under this interpretation, the Clean Air Act provides the
EPA with more than just an intelligible principle for defining and regulating
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles: it provides an explicit command to
classify greenhouse gases as air pollutants and, if necessary, to regulate them as
such.101
The textual arguments underlying Massachusetts v. EPA could be newly
consequential if the nondelegation doctrine were revived and strengthened. In
particular, the proper definition of a “pollutant” under the Clean Air Act came under
contention when Massachusetts v. EPA was first before the Court, along with the
scope of the EPA Administrator’s discretion and obligations toward greenhouse gases
if they were indeed pollutants.102 The dissent by Justice Scalia discussed above argued
that carbon emissions could not be considered pollutants within the definition laid
out in the Act.103 The Act defines an “air pollutant” as “any air pollution agent or
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”104 As already discussed,
the dissent argued that “including” necessarily dictated that “any physical, chemical
. . . substance” must first be an “air pollution agent or combination of such agents”
before falling within the scope of the act, and that carbon emissions were arguably
not “air pollution agents.”105 Justice Scalia additionally noted that “[a]s the Court
recognizes, the statute condition[s] the exercise of EPA's authority on its formation
of a 'judgment’ . . . There is no dispute that the Administrator has made no such
judgment in this case.”106 Under the dissent’s argument, the EPA Administrator
would have the discretion to classify or not classify greenhouse gas emissions as air
pollutants, along with significant leeway in assessing whether or not to even issue a
judgment on an air pollutant.107 The majority, meanwhile, wrote that “[t]he Clean
Air Act's sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant’ includes ‘any air pollution agent or
99.

Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 529.
102. Id. at 529, 532-33.
103. See id. at 559-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
105. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 556-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see generally id. at 549-560
107. See id. at 550 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)).
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combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air’ . . . The statute is
unambiguous.”108 The dissent’s view reads the statute to place considerably more
discretion in the hands of the agency than the majority does.109
A nondelegation challenge could potentially aim to revisit this very
controversy; if the statute were read to grant such immense latitude to the EPA
(especially without even mentioning climate change), the statute would potentially
fail a nondelegation challenge under a regime similar to the one outlined in Justice
Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent.110 Accordingly, even if the dissent’s interpretation from
Massachusetts v. EPA ever did take hold, one could potentially still defend the
provision by arguing that it simply made statutory application dependent on
executive fact-finding, a constitutionally permissible delegation according to the
Gundy dissent.111 One caveat, however, is that vagueness (e.g. the lack of statutory
guidance as to the proper definition of an “air pollution agent”) and the potential for
a stricter nondelegation doctrine to operate in tandem with major questions doctrine
may still ultimately fell the provision – the Clean Air Act does not mention climate
change and, as a result, it comes off as potentially vague as applied to greenhouse gas
regulation, and potentially runs afoul of the major questions doctrine.112
Notably, two compelling angles to determine the proper scope of the Clean
Air Act’s “including” and the decision that the EPA Administrator must make and
act on their decision are stare decisis and the constitutional avoidance canon. Stare
decisis, the central legal principle of determining case outcomes in accordance with
precedent weighs in favor of preserving the majority’s interpretation from
Massachusetts v. EPA (although, it would also weigh in favor of preserving the
intelligible principle test). Simply put, the Court generally only overrules its
precedent in highly compelling scenarios.113 Here, it would be difficult to say that
stare decisis renders Massachusetts v. EPA moot: in fact, even Justice Scalia
conceded in his Massachusetts v. EPA dissent that the majority’s interpretation of the
text at issue (“including”) was a fair reading of the statute.114 As Justice Kagan
elaborated in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, before overturning settled precedent,
the Court has in the past required a “special justification” beyond a simple belief that
the precedent is wrong.115 Stare decisis is additionally even stronger when the
precedent interprets a statute, as Massachusetts v. EPA does, because “critics of our

108. Id. at 528-29.
109. See id.
110. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q; see supra at 11.
111. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019).
112. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
113. Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455-56 (2015).
114. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 557 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Kimble, 576 U.S. at 455.
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ruling can take their objections across the street, and Congress can correct any
mistake.”116
The canon of constitutional avoidance, however, works in a more nuanced
fashion. Constitutional avoidance dictates that when deciding between two potential
statutory interpretations where one interpretation renders a statute unconstitutional,
and the other does not, that the Court should favor the constitutional
interpretation.117 Applied to Massachusetts v. EPA, even though that case did not arise
under a nondelegation question, its holding could still mitigate any potential
nondelegation issue through the constitutional avoidance canon. This is true because,
in a nondelegation context, where Justice Scalia’s reading would potentially result in
an impermissible delegation to the EPA, the constitutional avoidance canon suggests
that the Court should endorse the original interpretation, which may stand a chance
at surviving a revived nondelegation doctrine.118 Even if Chief Justice Roberts,
Justices Thomas and Alito (the active Court members who joined Justice Scalia’s
dissent), and any other members of the Court believed that the dissenting
interpretation in Massachusetts v. EPA was correct, the constitutional avoidance canon
asserts that they should defer to the permissible, narrower reading of the statute
espoused by the majority. The majority opinion limits agency discretion compared
to the dissent and, consequentially, limits any potential nondelegation violation.119
Thus, a stricter nondelegation doctrine appears unlikely to legitimately
threaten Title II’s current mandate for the EPA. Unlike Title I’s thin defense at the
hands of the narrow holding of Whitman, Massachusetts v. EPA settled on a textual
interpretation that may be enough to preclude most nondelegation challenges.

C. New Legislation
New legislation offers an opportunity to erase nondelegation issues in
climate change law. Specifically, a new law could address nondelegation issues by
either affirming and explicitly specifying the EPA’s existing duties regarding climate
change or by creating an entirely new framework for mitigating climate change. The
biggest challenge, however, is that new legislation is challenging to design, pass, and
protect.120 Nevertheless, considering the complexities of climate change and the
extensive mitigation efforts necessary, new legislation may be a necessity before long,
116. Id. at 456.
117. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.").
118. See supra at 24.
119. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
120. See generally, e.g., Andrew Rudalevige, Why does Congress have such a hard time passing laws? Let’s
blametheConstitution,WASHINGTONPOST(July11,2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/11/why-does-congress-have-such-ahard-time-passing-laws-lets-blame-the-constitution/.
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regardless of the nondelegation doctrine’s potential to resurface and invalidate key
mandates of the Clean Air Act.
Due to the pressing nature of climate change, some may view the immense
challenge in passing new legislation as an inviable route for addressing nondelegation
concerns. To achieve peak efficacy, however, any new legislation must consider and
preemptively meet the threshold requirements imposed by a stricter nondelegation
doctrine. Such considerations are necessary whether that legislation simply affirms
the EPA’s mandates to regulate greenhouse gas emissions or installs an entirely
different network for combatting climate change. If written correctly, new legislation
can put any potential nondelegation issue to rest before the Supreme Court allows it
to be raised, but new legislation as a solution is challenging to implement and
vulnerable to partisan nullification.121
Given the significant social and economic implications of carbon emission
regulation, any legislative reform aimed at mitigating climate change risks severe
frustration if forced to comport with nondelegation principles. A new nondelegation
doctrine in line with the doctrine outlined in Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent may
limit legislators’ ability to provide flexibility and decision-making power to the
EPA.122 Ambitious, open-ended legislative commands such as Title I’s “requisite to
protect the public health” may be too vague to pass a nondelegation challenge against
a harsher standard than the intelligible principle test.123 However, if legislators are
cognizant of the potential issues that a stricter nondelegation standard may carry for
legislation, they can take a few steps to protect any new bills focused on fighting
climate change. First, any new legislation focused on limiting climate change should
clearly state the EPA’s assigned task: to mitigate the effects of climate change by
whatever measures the bill specifically provides for. The problem, however, is that
crafting specific goals, standards, and implementation plans against the pressured
backdrop of a legislative calendar may be more challenging than tasking the expertdriven EPA with determining such goals and standards.124 As mentioned earlier,
proposed efforts such as the Green New Deal, which would seek to address several
climate change-adjacent issues including systemic racism and the increasing wealth
gap, would be logistically near-impossible for the legislature to craft without
significant reliance on the executive branch and agencies to design and implement
expansive systemic reforms.125 In this regard, the legislature could potentially find
success in focusing on more simple, widely applicable climate change-focused statutes
that would be easier for a legislature to design while affording maximum
administrative flexibility, which in turn could promote both legislative effectiveness
and optimal EPA operation. Such a set-up could lessen the legislative burden by
121. Id.
122. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136-37 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Rudalevige, supra note 120.
125. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019).
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reducing the required specificity of the legislation and enable the EPA to easily adapt
its regulatory regime with up-to-date science and improved technological
possibilities.
Further, a revived nondelegation doctrine will make nearly all future
legislation, not just climate legislation, more difficult and time-consuming for
members of Congress to prepare, consider, and vote on.126 Such a constraint is highly
relevant, even more so when considered in addition to a stricter nondelegation
standard’s potential to render several statutes with vague intelligible principles
vulnerable to constitutional challenges.127 All members of Congress, especially those
members of the House of Representatives who serve two-year terms and are
constantly balancing the duties of their job with reelection efforts, would have to
reorient their legislative efforts while trying to represent their district in a new and
confusing era of legislation.128
Finally, a new bill would likely face many traditional barriers that
consistently get in the way of climate change legislation and legislation in general.
Many members of Congress encourage and practice climate change denial
regularly.129 Even members of a minority party can subject a bill to various
procedural hang-ups, such as the filibuster.130 Other methods can prevent legislation
from ever receiving proper consideration, as recently demonstrated with the Green
New Deal Resolution in 2019, where the resolution was rushed to a vote in the Senate
without opportunity for hearings or expert testimony.131 New legislation aimed at
126. See, e.g., Rudalevige, supra note 120.
127. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130.
128. See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 39.
129. This point is well illustrated by stunts such as Senator Jim Inhofe brandishing a snowball on
the Senate floor in 2015 during a speech questioning the validity of science behind climate change. See
Sen. Jim Inhofe denies climate change, tosses snow ball in Congress, CBS NEWS (Feb. 26, 2015),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sen-jim-inhofe-climate-change-is-not-real-because-here-is-a-snowball/.
Senator Inhofe’s climate science denial is far from an outlier – a 2019 article found that 130 members of
the 116th Congress had at some point expressed doubt toward or outright denied climate change. See Ellen
Cranley, These are the 130 current members of Congress who have doubted or denied climate change, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/climate-change-and-republicans-congressglobal-warming-2019-2.
130. See generally Tim Lau, The Filibuster, Explained, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 26,
2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/filibuster-explained.
131. The Green New Deal Resolution was a fourteen-page document calling for recognition of a
need for sweeping reforms in the interest of mitigating detrimental climate change and environmental
injustice. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). The resolution failed in the Senate by a voting margin of 057. Dino Grandoni and Felicia Sonmez, Senate defeats Green New Deal, as Democrats call vote a ‘sham’,
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/green-new-deal-ontrack-to-senate-defeat-as-democrats-call-vote-a-sham/2019/03/26/834f3e5e-4fdd-11e9-a3f778b7525a8d5f_story.html. Forty-three Democratic senators, among them those who introduced the
resolution in the Senate, voted “present” in order to protest the bill being quickly brought to a vote without
hearings or expert testimony. Id. Some members of Congress called the process a “rush” and a “sham.”
See, e.g., Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (March 26, 2019, 6:13 PM),
https://twitter.com/aoc/status/1110666127644991493?lang=en; see also Dino Grandoni and Felicia
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addressing climate change will almost certainly face immense opposition regardless
of the intelligible principle test’s status, but a more stringent nondelegation test may
frustrate legislative efforts further.132
As alluded to earlier, new legislation could initially bypass some of these
obstacles by simply restating and affirming the emissions regulation systems already
in place, removing any potential question of an unconstitutional delegation. Such an
action would at least be capable of preserving existing governmental structures for
climate change mitigation, although structural preservation alone appears unlikely to
be enough to reach some of the potential emissions reductions targets detailed by the
IPCC.133
Regardless of the necessity of new legislation as a solution to protecting the
Clean Air Act’s functions and to mitigating climate change at large, a Congress
interested in passing new legislation to combat climate change will have to consider
the viability of its proposals against the nondelegation doctrine.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The nondelegation doctrine is, for now, a momentary blip in American
constitutional history. Its erosion was arguably a prerequisite for an efficient federal
government.134 Over eight decades later, the nondelegation doctrine threatens to
resurface and reshape the federal government as we know it.135 Indeed, many
contemporary federal functions and statutory regimes would potentially be
unconstitutional under a stricter nondelegation standard.136 While much more is at
stake than the EPA’s ability to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, the calamitous,
looming threat of climate change renders the EPA’s mandate among the most crucial
to protect.137
The clash between the nondelegation doctrine and the EPA’s framework
for regulating carbon emissions could be inevitable if the Supreme Court does
significantly restrict the intelligible principle test. With motor vehicle emissions,
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preserving the Clean Air Act’s mandate that the EPA regulate such emissions likely
rests on preserving the Supreme Court’s most recent statutory interpretation on the
issue, but even that may not be enough. Future legislative efforts will have to
carefully balance efficiency and constitutionality in deciding what work and goals to
specify clearly, and what work and goals to leave for the administrator. To avoid
critical damage to the fight against climate change, preemptive thinking and
successful political action will likely be necessary for the near future.138
It is always challenging to predict how the federal government will respond
to critical problems. With the urgency of climate change and the potential necessity
of severe mitigation measures, projecting the federal response only becomes more
difficult amidst increasing political disorder and calls for significant changes to the
federal government. In recent months, high-ranking United States government
officials have proposed reforms, including potential Supreme Court expansion139 or
term limitation for Justices.140 Growing support for granting statehood, and thus
federal senate seats, to places like Washington D.C.141 or Puerto Rico, may
fundamentally alter an ongoing partisan battleground and greatly influence what
sorts of climate legislation are viable. The Supreme Court may decide not to radically
reform the intelligible principle test after all, reducing the danger to existing federal
statutes, or, even if it does, the Clean Air Act may never find itself the subject of new
judicial scrutiny.142 The predictive value of projected changes to constitutional
doctrine and assessments of the difficulties in passing legislation are only valid so
long as the background assumptions and conditions belying those projections
continue to exist.
With no end in sight, the battle against climate change has been hard-fought
and without many victories. If strengthened beyond the intelligible principle
standard, the nondelegation doctrine may nullify some of the most significant
victories at a time where each loss is more devastating than the last. Careful
constitutional arguments, deliberate legislation, and other creative measures provide
a limited opportunity to prevent, undo, or respond to the potential harm that that
nondelegation doctrine stands to inflict on the EPA’s current emissions regulation
regime.
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